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INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THE CLAUSE
"REBUS SIG STANTIBUS"
P. BULLINGTON
During the past quarter of a century the increase in complexity of international relations and the growth of economic
interdependence among nations have required that states regulate their relations more and more by treaties, since customary
international law has been unable to keep abreast of modem
developments. Despite the continuous violation, both of treaties
and of customary rules of international law, by all the contestants in the recent European war, treaties continue to be drawn
and signed, and seem on all sides to be regarded as effectively
binding the parties to them. The importance of treaties as a
present means of establishing peaceful intercourse and mutually
advantageous economic relations between states makes it worth
while to reconsider the doctrine advanced and accepted by most
modem writers which would, under varying circumstances, authorize the abrogation of treaties without the consent of all the
contracting parties-the mere fiat of a single state being sufficient
to annul freely contracted obligations. This theory is usually
discussed under the heading "The Rebus Sic Stantibus Clause."1
It is scarcely to be doubted that treaties are ordinarily consummated after a due consideration by all parties of the possible
benefits which may in the future accrue to them through the
operation of the treaty under consideration. It .so happens that
one state often finds that it has made a bad bargain, or that it
failed to take into consideration future contingencies ihat might
operate to its disadvantage Thus the state may find itself bound
either for a term of years or in perpetuity to a contract, the
execution of which may entail varying degrees of injury to
itself. It is just possible that the continued existence of the
state as an independent political division may be threatened. On
the other hand, mere hardship may flow from the execution of
the treaty.
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Grotius and the natural law writers, influenced perhaps
by the rigor of the Roman law of contracts, saw no legitimate
relief for the suffering party, but would require the complete
fulfillment of the terms of the treaty.2 Vattel, however, excepted
those treaties which would be "pernicious" to the contracting
state, or would result in a neglect of the sovereign's duty towards
his citizens.3
Since Vattel's time, writers on international law have come
to an almost unanimous recognition that the clause rebus sic
stantibus is to be read into every treaty, though pacta sunt servanda is still retained as the rule. 4 Despite this unanimity of
opinion as to the existence of the clause in treaties, there is little
agreement as to what it means or the effect that is to be given to
it. Some authorities would severely limit the field of its application and deny any unilateral interpretation of it,5 while others
would read into it a meaning which would result in the state
being bound by the treaty only so long as it saw fit.8 The reasons for the existence of the clause are found by some to be in
the nature of the state and its sovereignty,7 by others it is deduced
from the fact that nations make treaties only for their own benefit,8 and by still others it is based upon the theory that certain
attributes of the state, such as "freedom of internal development," "sovereignty," etc., are inalienable. 9
'GROTIUS,
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'VATTEL, LE DRoIT DES GENS, Liv. II, Ch. XII, 372, 378.
'The authorities are collected in Chapter IV of KAUFMANN, DAS WESEN
DES V6LKERRECHTS UND DIE CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS (Tfibingen, i9u).
Fiore seems to be the only European writer who condemns the theory categorically and without exception. See FIORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CODIFInD
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Manifestly, if Treitschke's theory of the state as force '0
be accepted, we are compelled to admit that the state may at any
time abrogate treaties barring the expression of that force. Tbh
theory that the state cannot limit itself must also lead to the same
conclusion. Here, as in so many branches of the law, the influence of the Austinian concept of "sovereignty" has worked injury to the free development of the law. Deifying the sovereignty of the state, as does Jellinek,'1 for example, leads inevitably to the conclusion that treaties are mere "chiffons de
papier." No less disastrous would be the results if the theories
of Ullman 12 and de Louter 13 were accepted. To them the state
can be bound only by its own will, which logically means that
it cannot be bound at all. Treaties could be broken whenever
it seemed expedient for the state to do so. Under such theories
no necessity should be felt for implying a rebus sic stantibus
clause to justify a treaty abrogation. Fortunately, experience
so effectively denies such theories that there is little danger of
their continued general acceptance; yet it cannot be denied that
these highly metaphysical concepts of the state and sovereignty
have exerted a powerful influence upon courts and legal thinkers
alike."'
The more modern functional theories of the state, in denying to its government any such extraordinary lowers as -were
postulated by Bodin and Hobbes for their sovereigns, have done
much to break down the old rigid concepts and replace them with
more realistic and flexible ones.
It is thus apparent that the legal nature of treaties and the
possibility of legally abrogating them has not been immune from
the influence of political theory. If the notion of the supremacy
of the state over law be accepted, then it is useless to discuss the
" TRErISCHKE, POLITICS (I916)

3 if.

"JELLINEK, op. cit. supra note 7, passim.'
9JLLMAN, V6L:ERRECHT, 2 auf. (Tilbingen, i9o8) 6.
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Dutch) (Oxford, izg2o) i72ff.
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"See the exposition of these news in Borchard, PoLITIcAL THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, in the volume of essays, MmRAM AND BARNES, POLITICAL
THEORIES (1924) 120-140.
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effect of treaties. The effect will be only whatever a particular
state wants it to be, provided, of course, that state is physically
capable of enforcing its wishes. If, on the other hand, we accept
the theory that the state is bound by law, and particularly by international law, as experience impels us to do, it becomes most important to discover the legal effect of treaties. In attempting to
discover the validity or non-validity of the rebus sic stantibus
clause, the latter theory of the existence of some law, binding
states, will be accepted.
Many states have found the theory underlying the rebus
sic stantibus clause not repugnant to their particular interests,
and have not hesitated to make use of it. How far this practice
supports the validity of the theory must be determined by an examination of the precedents in the attempt to find their meaning.
The classic example is that of Russia's note of 19/31 October,
187o, notifying the other powers that she no longer considered
herself bound by Articles II, 13 and 14 of the Treaty of Paris

(March 31, 1856), neutralizing the Black Sea and limiting Russia's forces there. It is noteworthy that Russia assigned as
reasons for her attempted unilateral abrogation of the treaty
certain alleged violations of the treaty by the other signatory
powers as well.as the changed conditions then existing. 15 Russia's action resulted in a conference at London of the powers involved, where a new treaty was drawn acceding to Russia's
demands. At the same conference a protocol was signed by all
the parties, including Russia, to the effect that they recognized,
as a principle of international law, that no nation could be absolved from treaty duties without the consent of all the parties,
and after an amicable agreement.-" Russia acted upon the theory
of the rebus sic stantibus clause, but her act was recognized as
legitimate by no other state.
Few writers, however, have found this declaration made
at London incompatible with their ovn theories of the clause.
Certainly Russia found it no obstacle to a subsequent declaration
that due to changed circumstances the port of Batoum would no
supra note 4, at 12 et seq.
DE MARTENS, NouvEAu RECEUIL DES TRAITts, ie set., t.
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longer be a free one, despite Article 59 of the Treaty of Berlin.
Here again Russia was not sufficiently sure of change of circumstance alone justifying the breach of a treaty provision, and
argued further that the particular article of the treaty was a
mere gratuitous voeu on the part of Russia and therefore never
legally binding. 17 The instance was of such minor importance,
however, that other nations concerned were not disposed to oppose Russia's aims, so the incident has little value as a precedent.
In both cases Russia offered numerous reasons for her acts
founded' on the "security and dignity of the Empire" and the
"peril" in which the respect of her engagements would put her.18
The Treaty of Frankfort, signed in 1871 after the cessation
of hostilities between France, and Germany, provided that the
nationals of each of the parties should be allowed free access
and residence in each country, and provided for them the most
most favored nation treatment. Nevertheless, Germany later
established extremely onerous conditions on the entrance and
residence of French citizens in Alsace-Lorraine. The action was
supported on the ground of changed conditions-in this case the
alleged anti-German plotting both in France and Alsace-Lorraine.
These changes, it was argued, justified Germany in ignoring the
treaty obligations as a measure of "self-preservation." The pro
tests of France were of no avail, and obviously that nation was
in no position to make a forceful demand for the observation
of the treaty. 19
Austria offers as a precedent the annexation of BosniaHerzegovania in 19o8 despite her obligation under Article XXV
of the Treaty of Berlin only to occupy the territory. The excuse given was the changed conditions then existing in the Balkan
states, notably the fusion of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia.
There was some protest by the other powers .interested, excepting Germany and Russia, but when the latter accepted the change
' See Rolin-Jacquemyns, La question d'Orient en x85-6, 19 REV. DE DRorr
INT. ET LG-iS. Comp., 37-49.
"KAU MANX, supra note 4, at 13, note 2.
Rolin-Jacquemyns, La question des passeports en Alsace-Lorraine,20 REV.
DE DR IxT. ET LEGis. CoMP., 615-623.
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the matter was dropped. 20 It is to be noted that in this case the
annexation made little difference in the European situation since
Austria-Hungary was already by virtue of the Treaty of Berlin
fully occupying and administering Bosnia-Herzegovania.
Again, in 1913 the clause was invoked by Servia in an attempt to have the treaty of 1912 with Bulgaria revised on the
ground that Bulgaria had changed the policy of the war then
in progress from a defensive to an offensive one. It was also
argued that Servia had lost her Adriatic Littoral while Bulgaria
had acquired Thrace. These changes in the situation, it was
said, were not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time the treaty was signed. Servia, therefore, claimed the right
to a revision of the treaty, or if that be refused, the right to uni21
laterally denounce the treaty was claimed.
In our commercial treaty of 1815 with Great Britain, St.
Helena was opened to us for commercial purposes, but upon
Napoleon being confined there, Great Britain notified the United
States that the island would again be closed, which policy was
pursued until the death of Napoleon. This was a mere unilateral suspension of a treaty provision, since Great Britain
eventually accorded to the United States all the privileges provided for in the treaty. It does not appear, however, that the
United States admitted the right of Great Britain even to suspend the treaty because of changed circumstances. 22
The United States has not always allowed treaty obligations to stand in the way of supposed internal exigencies. During the World War, aliens were drafted into the United States
army, despite treaty obligations with many nations not to do
so. 23 Some of the United States' legislation during the period
of 1882-1893 was considered by China to be contrary to the
treaty obligations of the United States. 2 4 Perhaps the most in"' Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 31 et seq. T1he political aspects of the case are
examined in G. LowEs DICKINSON, THE INTERNATiONAL ANARCHY, 1904-1914
(1926) I55-185.
CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. I916)
442.
FOSTER, PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY (1906) 298-309.
(1918) 28 YALE L. J. 83, note.
" IV MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (i906)
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teresting case, however, concerns the demand made in i88i upon
Great Britain for a revision of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 25
It was pointed out that the United States had grown enormously
during the thirty-eight years the treaty had been in force, and
that the expansion of the nation made a continuance of the treaty
incompatible with the national interest and safety under the new
circumstances. It was said that
. . . this government, with respect to European
States, will not consent to perpetuate any treaty that impeaches our rightful, long-established claim to priority on
the American continent"
and further that
" ..the government of the United States would
feel it had been unfaithful to its duty and neglectful towards
its own citizens if it permitted itself to be bound by a treaty
which gave the same right through the canal to a warship
bent on destruction that is reserved to its own navy sailing
for the defense of our coast and the protection of the lives
of our people." 26
As is well known, the discussion ended amicably in the HayPauncefote Treaty of i9oi.

The agreement of i818 between the United States and Great
Britain relative to armaments on the Great Lakes was violated
by both parties as changing conditions seemed to them to demand
it. Here again we find "changed conditions" being combined
with "national safety" and "interest" as an excuse for treaty
breach. It is further noteworthy that in each instance the act
contravening the treaty stipulation met with protest from the
27
other party.
The'recent legislation in Mexico giving effect to Article 27
of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 is in conflict with Mexico's
treaty obligations towards several countries. This failure to
observe treaty obligations has also been defended by invoking
III Ibid., 130-254.

'Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell, FOREIGN RELATIOxS (188i) 555.
1 I MooRE, supra note 24, § 143.
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the rebus sic stantibus clause as implicit in all Mexico's treaties. 23
Articles 31 and 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, denouncing
respectively the treaty of 1839 neutralizing Belgium, and that
of 1815 providing for neutral zones in Savoy, are said to be examples of the operation of the clause. The articles of the treaty
do mention changed conditions, but it is to be remembered that
the nullification of the old treaties was by means of a new one, no
implied clause in the old treaties being necessary for such a procedure.
Several recent unilateral denunciations of treaties have
taken place which would perhaps be excused if the rebus sic
stantibus be admitted as having a recognized place in international law. Persia in 1918 declared that the treaties establishing
spheres of influence there (particularly the Anglo-Russian
treaty of 19o7) were null and void.2 9 In 1919 China announced
that she would no longer be bound by the treaties of 1913 and
1915 with Russia and Mongolia, it being said that the Mongolian autonomy created by the treaties no longer corresponded
to the latter's wishes. An unsuccessful protest was made by
Russia. 0
Norway, claiming that the establishment of the League of
Nations together with the other changes of the European situation since the war made the treaty of 19o7, guaranteeing the
territorial integrity of Norway and requiring that nation not to
alienate any portions of its domain, no longer binding, unilaterally denounced it on January 8, I924. ' With the exception
of Russia, the other signatory powers notified Norway that in
the future they had no intention of requiring the fulfillment of
the treaty. There was no indication, however, that the unilateral abrogation of the treaty was accepted. On the contrary,
the statements of the notes that the respective governments would
' MacGregor, . La fraccidn I del Articulo :?7 de la Constitucidn viola los
tratados celebrados por Mixico con algunas naciones extranjeras?, I REVsTA
MEx. BE DER. INT., 568-593.
' FAumcI.Lm, TRAZIr DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (8e. 6d.) Tome I,
Partie 3, 386.
" (1920) 27 RxV. GtN. DE DRorr INT. PUB. 1o6.
(1924) 31 ibid., 299.
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not in the future force their rights under the treaty indicate
that they did not consider Norway's announcement as putting an
end to it. Here again is a simple case of a treaty being abrogated
by the fiat of one nation because the other signatory powers had
no sufficient interest in its continuation.
Treaties involving extraterritoriality have sometimes been
the subject of debate on the matter of their abrogation by the
subjected country alone.32 In the case of Japan, the extraterritorial privileges were removed by mutual consent, and the
cessation of the capitulations in Turkey was recognized by the
Treaty of Lausanne, though Turkey had- long previously claimed
their end. The failure of the.United States to ratify the Treaty
of Lausanne places the United States in a somewhat anomalous
position, since that nation has not yet recognized that its extraterritorial privileges there are at an end. The question might
easily arise in this case as to whether or not Turkey would still
be bound to accord those privileges to the United States.
The present difficulties in China have occasioned large concessions on the part of Great Britain, perhaps in anticipation of
a unilateral declaration by China that the existing extraterritoriality treaties were no longer binding upon her because of
changed conditions. These treaties of extraterritoriality .we
somewhat similar in character to those establishing international
servitudes, and the several servitudes that were established by
the treaties that followed the late European war, such as the Kiel
Canal, may perhaps at some future time be the cause of an invocation of the clause.
Treaties of peace raise another interesting question of international law which may with propriety be discussed in conjuncton with the rebus sic stantibus clause. It is now universally
conceded that the doctrine of duress has no'application as between states. The doctrine is recognized, however, with respect
to the agents of the state appointed to conclude a treaty.3 3
Perhaps the theory of the equality of states may have influe. g., Travers Twiss and Paternostro on extraterritoriality in Japan.
REV. DE DR. INT. Er L-G. CoMP. 1-29; 176-200, and 25 ibid., 213-219.
'3 FAucHIzE, supra note 29, Tome I, Partie 3, 298.
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enced the acceptance of the rule that duress practiced by one nation upon another will not be recognized as such in international
law. States being equal, one cannot logically impose upon another. This idea is so obviously false as to merit little attention.8 4
It is usually said that if the doctrine of duress were admitted
in international relations, dire consequences would follow. The
conqueror would refuse an honorable peace and proceed to the
annihilation of his enemy, for otherwise there could be no certainty in the future relations of the belligerents. Stripped to the
bone, the argument is simply that once the doctrine of duress be
admitted there can be no stability in international relations.
The argument seems powerful, but an examination of it in
the light of experience somewhat lessens its force. The first
answer that comes to mind is that no particular stability is apparent under the present system, despite the claims that it tends
to preserve the status quo. Alsace-Lorraine has not yet ceased
to be a mere pawn upon the European checkerboard, and on our
own continent the case of Tacna-Arica lends little support to the
belief that refusing to allow the revision of a treaty of peace
makes for stability.
Two or three hundred years ago, perhaps, the argument
might have had some validity. Ceding far off, thinly populated
colonial territories, the value of which was not often fully realized, was apt to leave no such desire for revenge and the recovery
of the territory as do territorial c~ssions at the present time.
The extreme value of colonial possessions is now universally
recognized, and to part with them, or to cede territories thickly
populated with one's own people, such as Alsace-Lorraine or
Tacna-Arica, creates a continuing source of propaganda for war
parties, and tends more to disturb international relations than to
quiet them. It is quite simple to convince a nation's people of
the holiness of a war waged for the rescue of fellow nationals
thrown by a treaty into the jurisdiction of the former enemy.
" For a detailed examination of the theory of the equality of states see
D. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

EDWIN
(1920).
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In our times, as is eloquently attested by the Treaty of Versailles, the economic misunderstandings of treaty draftsmen 35
may well create a situation by which the whole world becomes
affected, and not merely the ex-belligerents as was the case
under an international system less highly integrated. The economic repercussions of a faulty treaty of peace may work such
havoc internationally that it may fairly be said that the whole
world has a legitimate interest in the revision of such improperly
drawn treaties.
Dangerous international situations also arise from treaties
of peace based largely on mistakes of fact imposed upon the conquered party. Such a situation has arisen from Article 231 of
the Treaty of Versailles, 'wherein Germany unqualifiedly
"accepts" responsibility for the war of 1914-1918. It now ap36
pears that such an assertion is probably contrary to the facts,
yet the large portions of the treaty directly based upon it continue
to be accepted by the victors as valid and not susceptible of revision. The need of revision of Article 231 and the articles based
upon it must be apparent to those who have inquired into the
international situation created by them, yet no method is seen
to bring about such a revision unless the conquerors become
convinced of the unwisdom of perpetuating a probable untruth.
So with the treaties imposing unusual international disadvantages upon nations, such as the unequal treaties with China.
These treaties cannot be regarded as having been freely entered
into by both parties, and a potentially evil international situation
arises from them which invariably ends in a clash. The collision
may result in a readjustment without the intervention of arms,
such as was the case with Japan, or it may lead to a display of
force such as is now to be seen in China.
It is difficult to conceive of an unjust treaty imposed upon
a conquered nation, or one too weak to resist the demands of a
more powerful state, which does not offer great incentive for a
"See particularly

KEYNES, THE EcoNo ic CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE

and the companion volume, A RmsioN OF THE TREATY (1922).
"Consult BARNEs, THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR (2d ed. 1927), and
G. LowAEs DIcKINSON, THE INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY, T904-I914, supra note 20.
(i92o),

164

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

future breach of peace. To argue that these treaties may not be
revised by applying internationally the doctrine of duress because
such a possibility would prevent stabilization assumes that the
present system prevents the evils which are attributed to that doctrine. It takes no long reading of history to perceive that whatever stability may be claimed by the present system is at best but
temporary

.

.

.

a sort of breathing space for the losing

party to gather strength for the attempt to recoup his losses. It
is not easy to see how a recognized application of the duress
doctrine to proper cases would make matters any worse. It is
-submitted that, in fact, it would probably improve international
relations. It is not suggested that the subjected nation unilaterally c*eclare itself released from obligations imposed by
violence. As in municipal law, a court would be required to
examine the facts of each case and pronounce judgment upon the
existence or absence of legal duress. The fact of duress could
scarcely be denied in the case of many treaties

.

.

.

the real

question is the advisibility of the fact being admitted by international law as the basis for a legal modification of such a treaty.
Instead of attempting to bring about the desired change by force
of arms, as is now the only possible way, the method of judicial
decision would be substituted.
It might be argued that the judicial decision would no more
definitely decide the question than would a decision by arms.
Perhaps there is some force in the argument, but even assuming its general validity, an amelioration is believed possible by
the judicial method. We may take the classic example of AlsaceLorraine as an illustration. Originally German, it has been
passed back and forth between Germany and France until racially
and culturally each nation is able to make a strong case for its
equities in the territory. This is so because after each war the
defeated nation has required so long a, time to regain sufficient
force to warrant an attempt to regain the lost territory that the
conquering state has had ample time to plant and nurture its own
people, culture and language among the original inhabitants.
With the territory thus divided in its inhabitants, both nations
continue always to have a vital interest in it. The present system,
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therefore, allows the creation of an artificial national interest
where there was none before and where none would have been
in the normal course of events. Every new "national interest"
means a new possibility for war. If, for instance, France is
successful in imposing a sufficient amount of her culture and
people in the Saar basin before the period arrives for that territory to choose between France and Germany, we shall have
created another Alsace-Lorraine, which would be far from helpful to the highly artificial relations already existing in Europe.
The intervention of a court for the decision of these questions would make possible an equitable restitution before an
artificial, yet continually growing, national interest could be impressed on the disputed territ6ry by the victorious nation. It
would be easier for France to forget the loss of territory containing only Germans than a territory comprised in half by her
own people. Obviously the mere decision of a court would not
dispel the feelings which attach to the old strips of territory which
have been handed back and forth, but it would make it possible
to prevent new ones from being created.
These suggestions are not offered with the idea that they
will immediately operate to improve international relations. It
must be admitted that there is little chance that the major nations
woulcl be willing at this time to accept them. The growth of
international law is gradual but none the less certain. It is believed worth while, however, to re-examine such ancient theories
or principles as seem to encourage rather than discourage international strife in the hope that discussion will be aroused which
may in the future attain such volume as to force the gradual
acceptance of legal theories more compatible with observed phenomena, and more conducive to the pacific relations of states.
It seems strange indeed, that writers on international law
should adopt a defunct principle of the civil law 3 allowing
states to escape obligations freely entered into, yet refuse to
recognize any theory which would permit the revision of treaties
'Lammasch, writing in II STmupp, WORTERBUCH DES V6LKERRECHTS, 10C.
cit. supranote r, remarks that while the theory was dying in the civil law, international law theorists took it up and attempted to perpetuate it.
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forcibly imposed and often notoriously inequitable. While admitting that the two types of treaties should be governed by different considerations, it would seem more conducive to the ends
of justice that the present system adopted by the writers be
reversed.
Returning now to the type of treaty freely entered into, we
note that the kinship of the implied clause rebus sic stantibus
and the so-called right of self-preservation is evident not only
in the words of the theorists, but in the reasons assigned by states
attempting to escape liability under a treaty because of "changed
circumstances." The various theories advanced are all the result
of i priori reasoning, the conclusions being based, as a matter
of fact, upon preconceived notions of political theory or analogies
culled from private law. Should we admit that treaties are concluded with the tacit understanding written into them that rebus
sic stantibus, we still have to solve what constitutes the rebus
mutatis. Here, in effect, is the danger and the fallacy of the
idea, for it leaves to each party to determine when a rebus
nutatis has occurred. Some writers maintain that a legitimate
escape by way of the clause may be had only after invitation to
the other party or parties to confer upon the matter and a failure
of the conference. 8 s Just how such a procedure would solve the
difficulty is not shown, for once the claise be admitted to a place
in international law the recalcitrant nation is not apt to modify
its demands to any great extent because of the objections of the
other party. Such a procedure would no doubt be more courteous than a simple unilateral declaration, but, it is submitted,
offers little in the way of a practical solution of the problem
involved. In view of the language of the United States in the
case of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty it is not to be supposed that
the United States could have been induced by Great Britain
greatly to modify the assertion that the old treaty could not
stand. England, it is submitted, agreed to a revision of the
treaty, not because of a recognition that the treaty contained a
tacit clause of rebus sic stantibus, but because it was the politic
Rolin-Jacquemyns in

20 REv. DE DR. INT. Er LG. CoMP. 623.
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thing to do under the circumstances, and because a refusal on
her part to negotiate a new treaty satisfactory to the United
States would probably have resulted in the loss of even those advantages which were retained by England under the HayPauncefote arrangements.
Austria-Hungary was allowed to annex Bosnia-Herzegovania with impunity, not because there was a tacit clause of
rebus sic stantibus in the Treaty of Berlin, but because Russia
and Germany, for political reasons of their own, refused to join
the other powers in a protest. 9 Likewise, Russia was in a favorable position to force her demands on the other powers after
the circular letter attempting to unilaterally abrogate the provisions of the Treaty of Paris relative to the Black Sea. The
protocol signed by the parties was, moreover, a categorical denial
of both the clause rebus sic stantibus and the idea that Russia
was legally disengaged from the obligations of the old treaty
until after the act of the London Conference.
The same type of observation might be made as to the other
alleged precedents for the existence of such. a clause in international law. In fact, no case is known to the writer in which a
nation has been able to escape treaty obligations because the
other party recognized the clause rebus sic stantibus as implied
in the treaty by international law. Rules of international law
do not grow from mere unilateral declarations of nations, no
matter how long practiced, when those declarations are uniformly
denied by other states. The opinions of the writers, even though
they be unanimous, cannot effectully create a rule of law when
the supposed rule is uniformly denied in practice. So far as is
known, the clause has never been considered by an arbitral
tribunal o" other international court, though there is dictum in
the case of Russia v. Turkey to the effect that-intervening force
40
majeure would be a good plea to a suit upon a treaty obligation.
,G. LowFs DICKINsoN, supra note 20, I68-I8I.
' 0 Scott, THE HAGUE Coua'r REPORTS 315. Kaufmann, supra note 4, at 58,
states that the Supreme Court of Switzerland has recognized the principle. The
United States Court of Claims recognized it in some dicta in the French Spoliation cases, citing Woolsey and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty case. Hooper v.
United States, 22 Ct. Cl.408, 416 (1887).
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Since the recognition in international law of such an implied
clause is at least highly questionable, it is well to examine the
claims for its necessity or desirability. It has been said that no
nation can intend to bind itself in perpetuity, and that such an
idea is incompatible with state sovereignty, and the very nature
of the state. 4 1 An analogy is found in the private law of contracts which refuses to give effect to contracts of service for life,
and the argument that the state is incapable of alienating certain
of its functions may find some analogy in the implied constitu42
tional limitations on the alienation of the public domain.
Analogies drawn from private law in support of international
law theory, while often useful, are by no means controlling or
necessarily desirable. What is useful and possible in private law
is not always so in international law. Were we, for example,
to accept the first analogy, treaties providing for international
services in perpetuity would be voidable immediately at the will
of the obligor. What then, for instance, would become of the
obligations assumed in the Danish sound which Denmark undertook for a money consideration paid by the other powers who
denied Danish proprietary claims in those waters. 43 May Germany repudiate her Kiel Canal obligations at any time because
she could not bind herself to furnish services perpetually? May
Panama at any time repudiate the obligations she undertook with
respect to the Panama Canal because she could not legally assume
those obligations.? What value would there by in concluding the
proposed treaty with France outlawing war between the two
nations if it be impossible for a state to perpetually bind itself ?
It is submitted that nations can and do obligate themselves without limit of time, and that to read into international law an outworn rule of private law, would necessitate such a large number
of exceptions as to reduce the rule to a mere series of words.
The second analogy, to the effect that nations may not
alienate certain attributes-usually designated by the writers as
'DE LOUTER, supra note 13, at 51o.
Cf. Illinois Central Ry. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (1892).
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"I MooaRE supra note 24, 659 et seq.

But see
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"sovereignty" or things held in "trust" for the people of the state
-is also of such vagueness as to make it practically unworkable.
The element of unilateral determination of treaty rights and
duties still remains, for the constitutional laws of the various
countries are by no means uniform as to what may or may not
be alienated by the legislature, and it is thus probable that each
nation would search its own, municipal law for analogy and
would demand that its own concept be accepted. Under such
rules the treaties now in force between the United States and
several of the Central American states would be terminable at
the will of any of them, inasmuch as the treaties provide for a
certain derogation of their sovereignty. It is is believed that
many of the writers who, assert such a doctrine had in mind the
ancient practice of secret treaties upon which the public was held
in ignorance. This, of course, would not include those writers
of the German Polizeistaat school. It 'was probably thought
inequitable that some monarch, in pursuit of his own political
scheming, should alienate the public domain, or perpetually bind
his people by an onerous treaty. With this idea was combined
the changing ideas of the nature of the state and sovereign
responsibility. It is not here maintained that the day of secret
treaties is past, despite the pious assertions of League diplomats,
but it is unquestionable that under the present system of parliamentary ratification of treaties it would be difficult'to make the
old reasoning support the doctrine. Witness the action of the
Swiss public not so many years ago when a railway treaty was
negotiated with Germany and Italy giving the latter nations
rights unlimited in time over Swiss territory which the Swiss public thought to be detrimental to the public interest. 44

So much

for the priv.ate law analogies offered. They are, of course, not
technically concerned with the clause rebus sic stantibuw, but have
been offered as evidence that there must be some sort of limita"Scelle, 20 REv. Ggr;. an DP. INT. PUB. 484-505, particularly pages 499-500,
where he maintains the theory that the clause operates when the end sought hy
the parties is no longer obtainable through the treaty, and defends the right of

either nation to decide for itself when the treaty ceases to contribute to that
end, even in the face of armed conflict. Cf. PRADmR-FontaM, op. cit. supra note
5, at 928.
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tion implied in treaties to prevent them from being permanently
effective.
Let us suppose for a moment that international law actually
does read the clause into treaties. WThat will be the practical
effect of it? Taken literally, any appreciable change of the
political or economic conditions existing at the time the treaty
was signed would entail its extinction if either of the parties
desired it. But if we are to believe the writers, the clause doesn't
mean that. Only certain types of changes, it seems, would justify a nation in claiming release from treaty obligations by means
of the clause. Thus if the treaty becomes incompatible with the
constitutional and private law growth of the nation, conditions
have "changed" sufficiently for a legitimate invocation of the
clause.45 Or, if the circumstances become so changed that the
observance of the treaty would be inconsistent with the so-called
right of "self-preservation," the clause would come into play and
relieve the sufferer.46 Thus an ambiguous clause is defined in
even more shadowy and disputable phrases. The danger of sanctioning such an indefinite and indefinable clause in the absence of
courts charged with delimiting its meaning must be recognized.
The above definitions of -rebus mutatis have called forth
both exceptions and denials. To some the changes interfering
with internal legal or economic growth do not constitute a true
rebus mutatis-the change must be such as to cause the treaty
to become a veritable threat at the very existence of the state,4 8
while others would merely distinguish between those internal institutions which represent an expression of the droit n6cessaire
(i. e., the state's idea of a proper political theory), and mere
administrative changes. 46b Still others assert that it may be in45-FFTmz, DRorr INTERNATIONAL (4e 6d.) 221; Olivi, D'un Cas Controversi
de Cessation de la Force Obligatoire des Traitis Internationaux,23 REv. DR DR.
IxT. nr Lft. COMP., 5go-6og.
HALT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1917) 361-37o, esp. 369. Note that
Hall severally criticizes Heffter, Hautefeuille, Bluntschli and Fiore for their
"high sounding generalities," and then offers as a yardstick the "right of selfpreservation" of states, a right which has exactly the meaning that each state
desires
to give it.
44
DESPAGNET-DFBOECK, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (4e 6d.) 707-710.
Rolin-Jacquemyns in 20 REv. DE DR., aTc., 615-623.
"b Olivi, in 23 REv. DE DR.,
rc., 59o-609.
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yoked only when the "highest interests" of the state are at
stake. 47. Most of the writers admit that the recognition of the
clause is dangerous, but would not on that account do away with
it entirely. It has been said that if the treaty were "loyally"
discussed by both parties, the result would be a conciliation of
the opposite extremes of the doctrine and the assignment of reasonable limits to the treaty.4 s It has also been assumed that circumstances of such a character as would justify the invocation
of the clause would be such that the benefited party would
readily acquiesce in the obligor's demands.4 9 To the first statement it may be answered that an amicable agreement may be
reached through a conference of the parties because the nation
demanding release still retains~a considerable bargaining power,
or because the benefited party find it politic to agree to a revision. The second statement assumes that the clause will be
invoked only in "proper" cases, those cases being such as would
appeal to the sense of justice of any state. In view of past practice the assumption would seem rather too sanguine. In either
case, however, the necessity of the clause rebus sic, stantibus is
not apparent. If the obligor is able to bargain himself out of a
bad position, or if the obligee for political or even equitable motives agrees to release the obligor from his excessive burden, it
is difficult to see just what the disputed clause has to do with it.•
It does not appear that the results would be any different if the
clause had never been heard of. 50 The writer is unacquainted
with any case where a treaty has been revised as a matter of
legal right.
"ScHumIT, Uana DiE VKixmEuRECHTLCHE CrAusuLA REaus Sic STANTiBus

(Leipzig, 1907) 25. Schmidt, however, denies any legal validity to the clause.
"Cavaglieri, La Funzione della ClausolaRebus Sic Stantibus nei TrattatiInternazionali,71 AxcHrvio Gniamico, zo6-140.
' Crandall, op. cit. supra note 2I, at 441.
5 For example, it is not uncommon for the legislature of a state to pass laws
contravening treaty obligations, thus forcing the governmental agency charged
with foreign relations either to nullify the legislation, if possible, or to negotiate
new treaties. This was done by the United States when the Lafollette Seamen's
Acts made it impossible for the executive to comply with the treaties requiring
the United States to return all deserting seamen to their ships. The nation whose
rights under the treaty are injured may demand some other compensatory privilege as a price for agreeing to a new treaty, or the new treaty may be agreed to
as a matter of comity.
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Two formidable objections to the clause have never been
adequately refuted, and it is believed that no such refutation
can be made. First, the usual treaty is now concluded for a certain term of years, with some type of "option" clause attached
for renewal or denouncement. The parties to such treaties
(usually commercial treaties) customarily take into consideration possible economic or political changes in the future, and
limit the obligatory term to such a period as they deem safe
for their individual interests. It is difficult to conceive of any
eventuality short of war, which, under such a treaty, would
even equitably entitle the obligor to relief. 51 The treaty is made
for a specified space of time for the very purpose of permitting
periodic adjustments to meet changed circumstances unforeseen
by the parties.
The second objection is that nations entering into treaties
are not unaware of the disputed clause, and there would be little
objection to the actual insertion of it into the treaty if the parties intended to contract in that fashion. Nevertheless, it is
highly improbable that any nation would be willing to sign a
treaty with the bare clause included, since it would be fatal to
the very purpose of the usual treaty-to provide a binding and
dependable delimitation of the rights and duties of the parties
with respect to a certain thing, or for the accomplishment of a
certain objective. To find by implication that the parties must
have understood such a clause to be part of the contract therefore does considerable violence to ordinary credence.
Furthermore, in actual practice, the theories heretofore advanced would tend to make pacta sunt servanda the exception
rather than the rule. The nation desiring to be freed of the
burdensome treaty might either attempt to do so by simple declaration, or might request a conference with the other party for
a revision of the treaty. In either case the obligee would be
" The Norway case (supra note 31) can scarcely be defended upon any
grounds of necessity. The treaty in question ran only for ten-year periods, and
was susceptible of denouncement by notice two years before the end of any
period. By waiting two years Norway could have denounced the treaty conformably with its terms. It does not appear that the two-year wait would have
worked any injury whatever upon Norway. The case is but a sample of the useless illegality made possible by the acceptance of the rebus sic stantibus clause.
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placed in the position of having to convince the obligor of his
erroneous assumptions. That is to say, the existence of a legal
unilateral means of escape from an onerous treaty obligation
would tend to encourage nations in seeking that escape, and a
certain air of righteousness might be lent to their actions. An
opportunity would be afforded for the breach of a treaty without
acknowledging it. This would be true, of course, only so long
as nations refuse to admit the possibility of judicial determination of questions said to involve the national "honor" 52 or
"safety", and that such judicial determination may come after
an automatic submission of the disputed question to an international court.
As has been noted above, the more noted cases involving the
clause in Europe have been concerned with treaties involving
the so-called balance of power. The existence of such a system
may have had a great deal to do with the development of the
notion that treaties were to be understood rebus sic stantibus.53
Neutrality treaties have in Europe been solely for the purpose
of preserving the "6quilibre," so that the clause might well serve
to excuse Germany's failure to observe the treaty of I839 neutralizing Belgium. The later close union of Russia and France
with the subsequent co-operation of Great Britain left Germany
with potential enemies on both the east and west frontiers. A
strong argument could be made that this change in the grouping
of the European powers was such a change as to make the treaty
54
no, longer binding under the rebus sic stantibus theory.
'See PERLA, WHAT IS NATIoNAL HONOR? (I919).
" Cf. Russia's report to the First Peace Conference at the Hague, where it
was said:
" . . . the mutual rights and duties of states are determined by the
totality of what we call political treaties, which are nothing but the temporary expression of chance and transitory relationship between the various
national forces. The treaties restrict the parties so long as the political
conditions under which 'they were produced remain" unchanged. Upon a
change in these conditions the rights and obligations following from these
treaties necessarily change also";
in ScoTT, REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES (917) 97.
"The Treaty of Versailles, by Article 31, ended the neutrality of Belgium,
it being said that it was no longer compatible with changed conditions. The difference between this treaty nullification and that of Germany is not so much one
of force of reason, but of method. The one was unilateral and illegal, the other
by a new treaty-a legal method.
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It is submitted that the clause rebus sic stantibus as sustained by the majority of writers is so pregnant with danger as
to outweigh any considerations of possible benefit which might
be derived from it in exceptional cases. We may even recognize the possibility of cases arising where the obligor should be
released from his obligation without thereby sanctioning the
clause. Is there no other way by which these exceptional cases
may be settled without seriously undermining the sanctity of
treaty obligations? Article i 9 of the Pact of the League of
Nations recognizes that treaties may be in need of revision,
and provides that in such cases the matter shall be handled by
the Assembly, which is, of course, the poorest means at the disposal of the League for such a purpose. The one attempt that
has been made to bring Article i9 into play has met with failure
and demonstrated the hopelessness of the Assembly as a means
for the revision of faulty treaties. 55 Article 6 of Project No. 21
of the American Institute of International Law,5 6 however, provides no means of putting an end to a treaty other than a fulfillment of the obligation; the expiration of the agreed time;
the disappearance of one of the parties, subject to the rights of
succession; or by renunciation on the part of the nation in whose
favor the obligation was created. Little assistance is therefore
to be found from these sources.
Some assistance may be found in the war-time development
of the English doctrine of "frustration" in contracts, in which a
tendency is shown towards recognizing economic impossibility
as well as absolute impossibility as a reason for the court to
grant a rescission of the contract. 5 7 This is quite similar to the
'Bolivia attempted to bring the treaty of 1904 with Chile before the Assembly, but upon an unfavorable committee report, the demand was withdrawn.
The consensus of opinion seems to be that no treaty may be considered without
the unanimous consent of the Assembly. Obviously the nation not wishing to
revise a treaty can always effectively block the efforts of the other party to that
end. The matter is studied in detail by Gomuwma, LA REviSioN
Sous yz RAGImE: DE LA SociErr DES NATIONS (Paris, z925).
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(1926) 2o AMmECAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Special Supplement, 349.
"See, for example, Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co., [1g18]
A. C. 1Ig, where a contract was held to be completely inoperative because of
extraordinary changes which involved a practical economic impossibility of per-
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continental doctrine of force majeure, and as has been noted
above, we are provided with at least a dictum of the Hague
Tribunal that the doctrine of force majeure is recognized by international law. The meaning and extent of the doctrines of
force majeure and frustration are reasonably clear, and are not
susceptible of being interpreted in any such free manner as the
clause rebus sic stantibus.5" Further, the demanding party
would not by these doctrines be placed in the advantageous position made possible by the rebus sic stantibus theory, since there
could be no widely diverging views as to the meaning of the
doctrines. But even though the theories above mentioned would
furnish a reasonably clear and stable measure for the determination of liability under a treaty, we must still recognize that the
intervention of an international court is necessary for a judicial
determination of the rights of the parties. Unfortunately nations
are still unwilling to submit to such courts matters pertaining to the national "honor" and "safety," though as a matter of
fact the "honor" spoken of is often translatable into terms of
dollars or pounds sterling. It is probable, therefore, that until
education in international matters has reached the stage where
the idea of a state being called to the bar of justice is no longer
shocking to national sensibilities, a judicial determination ad hoc
of whether or not a treaty continues to be binding on the parties
is not within the realm of probability. Unless the possibility and
method of revising a treaty be specifically decided beforehand,
any demand made for its later revision will necessarily be
founded on the national honor and safety.
The matter is not hopeless, however, and there is still one
solution for treaties to be made in the future which seems to be
formance, even though the contract provided for mere suspension in case of such
a contingency. For a brief comparison of the English and American practice,
see Conlen, The Doctrine of Frustrationas Applied to Contracts, (1921 70 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 87.
If the demanding party is able to support his demand for a rescission of
the treaty with the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, which is necessarily a vague
concept, the obligee is placed in the position of having to rebargain in the attempt to save whatever advantages he can from the old treaty or lose all of them
with the alternative possibihity of further loss through reprisals or war. If,
however, the demanding party is able to produce no such accepted doctrine, that
party actually has the burden of showing bona fides and a sound case in fact.
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within the realm of the possible. Under the present system, any
sort of implied clause or condition in treaties imports a danger
not present under like circumstances in municipal law. Unilateral determination of treaty obligations makes possible, and even
probable, either economic or armed warfare, either of which
would be of far more serious consequences than the observation
of the onerous treaty provision would have been. It is therefore imperative for the peaceful development of nations that the
rigor of the rule pacta sunt servanda be retained. The remedy
of implying the clause rebus sic stantibus is worse than what
little evil might result from a rigid observation of the rule. It
would, however, in no way impair the force of the rule if the
parties, at the time of making the treaty, were to insert a clause
providing that intervening force majeure or frustration would
entitle either party to a revision or revocation of the treaty, and
that in case of dispute the matter be settled by some international
judicial body. It is submitted that nations might be willing to
accept such a clause in treaties, since there is very little difference
of opinion as to what constitutes a force majeure or frustration,
so that they could contract with a considerable assurance of
knowing what the contract meant. Such a clause would also refute a later claim to the existence of an implied clause of wider
scope. It would forestall the invocations of national "honor"
and "safety" so often heard, and which almost invariably prevent a judicial determination of the question.5 9 If the matter
be entirely settled beforehand, no opportunity is left for justiciable
issues to ripen into political questions. Thus one type of
troublous question would be taken out of the category called
"political" and added to that described as "legal." 60 Every
question taken from the former category and placed in the latter
No real objection on the part of a nation is perceived to the submission
of a question of force maieure or frustration to a court, if the matter were
agreed on beforehand. Such an agreement at the time of making the treaty
would raise no questions of national honor, and if a question later arose, the
automatic submission to a court would forestall the dispute which usually results
in a refusal to arbitrate because the nation's "honor" has then become involved.
.oSee the analysis of BORCHARD, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND
POLITICAL QUESTIONS (1924), reprinted from the PROCEEDINGS OF THE Ai uimCAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(April 24-26, 1924).
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is an added step towards the establishment of law as the final
means of settling disputes between states.
The procedure suggested would require nations in treaty
matters to stand squarely on the basis of law or outlawry-the
equivocal and self-righteous position made possible by the theory
of the clause rebws sic stantibus would no longer be open to them.

